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ABSTRACT 
This study analyses the correlation between stock returns, corporate governance, and 
difference in stock returns between the good and weak governance portfolios.  The 
analysis is based on the updated corporate governance index of Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) and the stock returns of the S&P 500 firms for year 2008.  
The good and weak governance portfolio was built and had their stock returns average 
analysed and compared following the Gompers approach. 
A cross-sectional analysis indicated that there was no significant difference in stock 
returns between the good and the weak governance portfolios.  The analysis also 
reported that the level of corporate governance was insignificant in predicting stock 
returns.  The report on stock returns correlation with corporate governance was 
negative, which revealed that returns were higher for the good governance firms. 
Consequently, the overall analyses report was contrary to the study hypotheses. 
Finally, the relationship between stock returns, corporate governance, and control 
variables was also examined and the major findings were not consistent with the 
previous.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As a result of the global corporate scandals, more attention was centered on corporate 
governance system, especially in the financial management and the role corporate 
governance should play in investment policies.  This study argues that the differences in 
the quality of corporate governance are crucial to the firm’s stock returns.  An edition of 
the McKinsey and Company (2002) reported that institutional investors were willing to 
pay more for the shares of well-governed companies, especially, in emerging markets. 
They were also willing to reward companies that adopted good corporate governance 
practices.  The McKinsey Global Opinion Survey (2002) also shows that 22 per cent of 
European institutional investors are willing to pay about 19 per cent more, for the shares 
of a well-governed company.  They also considered corporate governance system to be 
more important than the firm’s financial issues, such as profit performance or growth 
potentials.  The argument, therefore, was whether well- governed firms were the key to 
higher future stock returns for investors or not.  The risks returns patterns between 
corporate governance and future stock returns were investigated to ascertain the impact 
of corporate governance on the stock market in the US and worldwide. 
 
Most academic debates focus on how corporate governance predicts stock returns. I 
believe that the study should also include ethical values.  This is because the distinction 
and empirical studies between these three variables can lead to more stock market 
stability devoid of financial meltdown. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe corporate 
governance as a process that deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance, to 
corporation, assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.  But the present 
challenge is to identify, clearly, what role corporate governance should play in the 
operation of the business policies to guarantee her future returns, especially, to the 
institutional investors.  As a result, the correlation between corporate governance and 
stock markets in predicting future stock returns is very important.  The recent US 
corporate scandals have shown the world the impact of corporate governance failures on 
the economy, through the collapse of the capital market.  Some scholars blamed the 
corporate governance mechanism, since it shapes and determines how contracts are 
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administered.  Thus, there is little understanding on how corporate governance affects 
the stock markets because of its complexity. Nonetheless, corporate governance issues 
should constantly be reviewed to meet the challenges of today.  In business terms, 
corporate governance is associated with risk and many uncertain factors that seem to 
drive the reflection of future stock returns in the market.  My aim in this research is to 
examine the reasons for the differences in stock returns through corporate governance 
ratings.  However, the idea that corporate governance affects future stock returns and 
companies’ performances can be determined only by continuous academic research and 
debates. 
 
1.1.      Background  
 
The traditional system of corporate governance was recently challenged by the 
corporate financial crisis due to the international impact as a result of globalisation.  The 
experience shows that corporate governance correlation across markets affects the risk 
return pattern internationally.  Hart (1995) argued that corporate governance refers to 
the existence of conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers, arising from 
the separation of ownership and control.  This fact explains the recent financial crisis 
and fraud perpetrated by managers.  Sullivan and Shkolnikov (2007) reported that 
corporate governance is concerned with creating the structure of decision making at the 
level of the Board of Directors and implementing those decisions.  Thus, addressing 
corporate governance at the management level is vital for the firm’s policy construction 
and implementation.  But Gompers, Ishii & Metrick (2003) demonstrated how corporate 
governance directly affects stock returns through the corporate governance ratings.  
They discovered a positive correlation in their regression results.  And their approach to 
the study of stock returns and corporate governance is employed in investigating the 
progress of this paper. Furthermore, there are ethical issues that drive the trends of 
transparency and corporate governance today.  Gold and Dienhart (2007) argued that in 
this new era of corporate governance, new cultural and legal expectations increasingly 
promote the ethical goals of protecting shareholders, employees, consumers, and other 
stakeholders, by fostering ethical economic landscapes which build healthy markets, 




The essence of stock market and their functionality is based on both exchanges and 
trading that can be predicted by some market, accounting variables, and technical 
indicators.  Van Landingham (1980) documented that the question on stock market 
efficiency had received great attention in the financial press over the years.  This is so 
because stock market and corporate governance are not only topic of interest to national 
policymakers charged with monitoring and promoting market efficiency, but also served 
as important implications for the management of market participants portfolios. 
Therefore, corporate governance may be a vital technical indicator to describe overall 
market activity and predict future stock returns. 
 
1.2.     Purpose of the Study 
 
Using ratings from the Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance index, the corporate 
governance system was grouped into two portfolios- The Good and the Weak 
Governance.  Good governed portfolio is a reflection of good compliances to corporate 
governance standards, while the weak governed portfolio is a reflection of poor 
compliances. 
 
In the United States and other parts of the world, corporate governance of individual 
companies has ratings.  It is assumed that this rating is used to differentiate the firms as 
well-governed-that is associated with good corporate practices, or weak governed-that is 
associated with bad.  The point is that corporate governance rating is supposed to 
provide confidence to their respective investors.  It shows that some firms have a sense 
of management and business ethics.  It also distinguishes the strength of the companies 
in their management capabilities.  Core, Holthausen & Larcker (1999) stated that it is 
obvious that one would expect poor stock returns in weak governed firms, but in an 
efficient market investors should expect no relationship between governance and future 





The main goal of this study is to investigate whether past corporate governance ratings 
and future stock returns are correlated, by using Gompers updated governance ratings to 
predict the firm’s future stock returns, and to compare the stock returns, and differences 
between the good and the weak governance portfolios.  This will further explain the 
reliability of the firm corporate governance ratings.   In order to investigate these issues, 
this paper will examine only the firms from the Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) index 
that are represented in the Gompers et al. (2003) historical corporate governance ratings. 
The idea is to use the 2006 Gompers corporate governance rating to explain the S&P 
500 future returns for 2008.  This work will also show the empirical evidence between 
corporate governance, stock returns and the control variables, which is determined by 
the average and cross-sectional analysis.  This study will be in-depth because the control 
variables are real determinant of systematic risk.  
 
The index of Gompers et al. (2003) is divided into two portfolios (good and weak 
portfolios).  The rating represents the corporate governance evaluation of the various 
firms that were determined by some set of 24 components.  The market and the stock 
returns as well as the control variables are estimated by using the expected return 
model. The multifactor model and cross-sectional regression are employed between the 
estimated stock returns, the corporate governance index, and the control variables.  The 
results are analysed to confirm whether the statistical report of the governance index 
and the control variables is significant to predict stock returns. 
 
A regression model is an applicable tool in portfolio management, in order to predict the 
future correlations of stock returns in the stock markets (Solnik, Boucrelle & Fur, 1996). 
Also correlation is a method of investigating the differences in the return patterns of the 
stock market.  It is the root of the diversification that gives an opportunity to reduce the 
risk without sacrificing return (Jacquier and Marcus, 2001).  In order to find out the 
return patterns, this thesis concentrates in the selected control variables such as beta, 





I hope to buttress the aim of this study using the models described above.  More so, with 
respect to the hypothesis and the arguments raised by the subject under review, I hope to 
provide answers in the theoretical section of this work.  Below are some of these 
questions. 
 
1. Does the system of corporate governance affect the returns pattern? 
 
2. How do the institutional investors affect corporate governance? 
 
3. In the financial world, how reliable are these ratings to the institutional investors? 
 
4. What relevance is business ethics in corporate governance practices? 
 
 
1.3.     Contribution 
 
The goal of corporate governance is to realize the best economic rate of return.  The 
quality of such governance must reflect the firm’s market and accounting variables 
such as beta, average returns, P/E ratio, liquidity ratio, firm value, book-to-market 
ratio, and equity of the firm.  Therefore, different qualities of corporate governance 
would affect the firm stock returns.  Such information is very important for investors 
and policy makers, as it is a form of investment strategy and portfolio management 
which can act as an instrument for policy regulation in the financial markets.  And, it 
can determine an optimal market portfolio for an investor.  Therefore, the major 
contributions of this study are as follows: 
 
1. To ascertain the relationship between stock returns and corporate governance 
variable.  
 
2. To ascertain the reliability and the relationship of the Gompers corporate 




3. To compare the stock returns and average difference between the good and the weak 
governance portfolios. 
 
1.4.     Hypothesis 
 
The hypothesis is formulated from the theory and previous corporate governance 
empirical findings.  The overview of the literature is provided in the theoretical section. 
The fundamental hypothesis has the same variables that previous researchers have 
deduced to have an impact on corporate governance.  
 
The first hypothesis is derived as a result of the increasing awareness of corporate 
governance ratings.  Gompers’ et al. (2003) and Drobertz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann 
(2004) discovered a significant relationship between corporate governance and stock 
returns.  Some economists claim that investors see corporate governance as a necessary 
building block for successful capital market while other investors see corporate 
governance not as a legal obligation they must comply with, but as a business 




The level of corporate governance predicts the firm’s future stock returns.  
 
The second hypothesis is based on the good and the poor corporate governance 
portfolios emphasized by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Their findings showed a 
surprising annual excess return based on the ratings of the corporate governance.  The 
portfolios are grouped according to ranks, applications and compliances. Koehn and 
Veng (2007) assertion whether corporate governance ratings functions as reliable 
indicators of a company’s returns or not was based on the argument as a result of the 
crisis that deeply eroded the reliability of the corporate governance ratings and their 







There is difference in stock returns between good and weak governance portfolios. 
 
A crucial question is whether these findings can be explained by market risk.  And to 
achieve this, market variables in determining systematic risk is employed. These 
variables are beta, market value, and book-to-market-ratio. Beta will test the systematic 
risk, market value the size through market recapitalization, and book-to-market ratio the 
growth and value of the firms. 
 
1.5.      Chapter Organization 
 
This research would be organised in the following sequence.  There is the theoretical 
and the empirical part.  The aim of the theoretical part is to introduce the research 
already done in this field and emphasize on their theoretical conception.  Chapters One 
to Five dwell on the theoretical aspect while Chapters’ Six to Seven are the empirical 
findings. 
 
In Chapter One, an abstract of the entire work is provided to give a preview of this 
paper.  The purpose of the study, which forms the framework of the theoretical findings, 
explains the research problems in brief. 
  
Chapter Two discusses the previous studies of the problem field and offers a literature 
review on corporate governance studies.  There is an extensive research on the subject 
under review, which centres on corporate governance and firm performance; corporate 
governance and business ethics; corporate governance and firm equity.  However, this 
chapter will concentrate solely on corporate governance and stock returns.  
 
Chapters Three and Four give an overview of the theoretical perspectives behind 
corporate governance practices and corporate governance structures.  Others explain the 
theories behind corporate governance ratings, stock returns and business ethical 
conducts. It further explains the concepts of institutional investors, non-executive 
directors, disclosures and transparency.  The understanding of the underlying theoretical 
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assumptions and business practices is essential.  This helps to make a reliable 
conclusion about their values and development. 
 
Chapter Five presents the data, samples and statistical models used in the empirical 
findings.  These include the expected return model, the models for estimating the 
control variables, the regression model, and the Gompers index.  The importance of this 
chapter is to demonstrate and illustrate, empirically, the objective of this paper. 
 
Chapters Six and Seven are the summation of the empirical part of this thesis.  The 
results are described in Chapter Six.  The portfolios predictions are analysed through the 
mean test and cross-sectional regression.  The results are determined by the statistical 
significance of governance index, and the control variables.  The prediction of the T-
statistics confirms the significance of the portfolios relationships using the multivariate 
model.  Finally, Chapter Seven presents the conclusion and summation of arguments. 
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2.     LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Corporate governance is a complex study on its own and has been a hot debated topic, 
mostly, between the shareholders and the principal agents, all looking for a common 
ground to satisfy agents and maximize shareholders profit. As a result of globalisation, 
new trend is growing within the corporate knowledge.  For this reason, corporate 
governance has received a lot of attention in the academic literature.  Therefore, this 
thesis is particularly interested on a segment in the past literature, which dealt with how 
corporate governance correlates with expected stock returns. 
 
Fama and French (1992) described the cross-section of expected stock returns with the 
role of the market beta, size, E/P, leverage, and book-to-market equity matched with the 
cross-section of average returns of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks.  Non-
financial firms are used in their study because of the low leverage over financial firms 
that see high leverage as distressed.  Also used, is the cross-section approach of Fama 
and MacBeth (1973).  Each month a cross- section of returns on stock is regressed on 
the control variables to confirm the hypothesis in explaining the expected stock returns.  
The time series of the monthly regression slope provides standard tests of whether 
different explanatory variables are on average price.  The size, E/P, leverages and 
BE/ME were measured precisely for individual stocks.  The result produced a positive 
significance between the size effect and returns, and a negative significance between 
beta and average returns.  They argued that the relation between beta and average return 
disappears when the size is controlled.  The result also produced positive cross-sectional 
relationships between average returns and size, average return and book-to-market 
equity.  The Fama and MacBeth regression confirm the importance of book-to-market 
equity in explaining the cross-section of average stock returns. 
 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny (2000) provided evidence of expected 
stock returns with differences in shareholders standards within 27 countries.  They 
investigated 539-firms from over 27 countries which had shareholders who controlled 
over 10 percent of the votes of the firm.  Most of the firm were from the World Scope 
database from rich countries, based on the 1993 per capital income as well as an 
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efficient stock market.  Firms with greater shareholders right, with low investors’ 
protection, are grouped as firms with bad corporate governance standard; while firms 
with greater investors’ protection and lower shareholders right, are grouped as firms 
with better corporate governance standards.  More so, the good and bad firms’ corporate 
governance standard were also selected on the bases of the laws and regulations of the 
countries.  Their result showed that firms incorporated in countries with better 
governance standards tend to have a higher valuation. 
 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) investigated the impact of corporate governance in 
the United States to long-term equity returns, firm value, and accounting measures of 
performance.  Their empirical work consists of 24 governance provisions on stock 
returns for about 1500 US firms from 1990 to 1999.  The firms were grouped into 
dictatorship and democratic portfolio.  They examined the returns of each portfolio by 
holding a long position on one and a short on the other.  Their result yielded an average 
annual return of about 8.5 per cent.  They also found out that investors who are 
investing in firms, which are ranked high, based on the index, are earning 8.5 per cent 
abnormal returns.  
 
Another assessment by Bauer, Guenster, and Otten (2003) confirms Gompers et al. 
(2003) position, that good corporate governance is associated with better stock returns. 
They compare the returns of portfolio consisting of well-governed companies to the 
return of a portfolio with badly governed companies.  They took samples from the 
FTSE Euro top 300 index which consists of the Euro zone companies matched with 
Deminor ratings which were stable over time from period 1997-2002.  They took a long 
position in the well-governed portfolio and a short in the badly governed. They 
discovered positive differences between the two portfolios which suggested that the 
Deminor rating has a relatively positive influence in determining the share return of a 
company.  They found out that the good governance portfolio outperformed the bad.  
The difference in the performance, after adjustment of the sector influences, is 




Drobertz, Schillhofer and Zimmermann (2004) investigated the impact of corporate 
governance on stock returns between the periods of 1998-2002 in Germany.  Their data 
was limited to one observation and they assume constant historical ratings.  They first 
sent out questionnaires to 253 German firms in different market segments and received 
answers from about 36 percent of these firms to enable them to construct their sample 
between well-governed firms and poorly governed.  After accounting for different factor 
exposures of the portfolios, their result corresponds with the findings of Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick (2003); it showed a surprising annual excess return of 16.4 percent. 
 
Core, Guay & Rusticus (2006) examined how weak governance causes weak stock 
returns from the angle of the firm operating performance and investor’s expectation. 
They constructed their samples by using the G-index score and the IRRC data that 
contain large companies from the S&P 500.  They matched the G-index to stock return 
data for over 12, 584 firms-years.  Missing data reduced the sample size.  Their result 
was quite different from the Gompers et al. (2003), Bauer, et al. (2003) and Drobertz, et 
al. (2004).  Cores et al. (2006) findings show no evidence that the stock 
underperformance surprises the market.  Their overall results do not support the 
hypothesis that weak governance causes poor stock returns. 
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that there is a continuous debate among scholars on the 
relationship of stock returns with corporate governance.  This means that extensive and 
rigorous research is needed on such matters.  However, in an efficient market there 
should be no relationship between corporate governance and stock returns.  But the 
2008 financial crisis reveals that stock returns and corporate governance were 
rigorously affected through interactions with macro-economic news (McQueen and 




3.    GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND STOCK RETURNS 
 
 
The US has unambiguously shareholder-oriented management and investor culture, 
known as the shareholder system.   This system ushered a better economic output during 
booming stock periods.  This is the setting from which the support for global 
convergence on shareholders system was built.  Commentators from other part of the 
world, especially Japan and Germany with stakeholder systems, credited the 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance of the US and Britain for strong economy 
and stock market (Hansmann & Kraakman ,1992).  A vibrant and booming stock market 
is very important because it is impressive to the investing public, media and 
policymakers.  Thus the market based shareholder’s system was the engine to the 
American stock market bubble of the 1990s.  That set the precedent for wider support 
and emulations (LaPorta, Rafael, Lopez de Silance, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, Vishny 
& Robert, 2000). 
 
3.1.     Stock Returns over Historical Periods 
 
The shareholder’s governance system of the US has been in place only since the 1980s. 
Therefore stock returns prior to that period would not be relevant in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the shareholder’s system because the US corporate governance has 
changed over time.  For instance, in the 1980s, power shifted from managers to 
shareholders when corporate takeover market arose, but with a relative constant strong 
social democratic tradition (Hansmann & Kraakman ,1992). 
 
From 1980-2000, the US stock market experienced falling interest and inflation rates 
(Binswanger, 1999).  The US historical record from 1902 to 2001 shows that the stock 
market return rose to 11.2 percent annually from 6.9 percent annual return rate.  The US 
also enjoyed historical high stock returns from 1946 – 1965, a period during which the 
now criticized manager –oriented model characterized American corporate governance. 
This led to the belief that managers’ pursuit of multiple interests lowered the overall 
efficiency of corporate governance.  However, at the same period (1980-2000) the 
stakeholders corporate governance stock markets in France, Sweden, the Netherlands, 
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Spain, Denmark, and Belgium all outperformed the US stock market.  The argument 
posits that there is no one system of corporate governance that is attributed to high stock 
returns.  So, caution must be observed when using historical periods in ranking national 
stock returns since stock markets need time to recover from prolong depressed stock 
prices.  This arises due to social, political, and economic factors that have little to do 
with corporate governance (Hansmann & Kraakman, 1992). 
 
Table 1     Stock Returns in 10 Countries (1980-2000) 
 
 
Country Annual Stock Returns 
(1980-2000) 
Corporate Governance 
Sweden 17.3 Stakeholder 
Netherlands 16.1 Stakeholder 
Spain 13.5 Stakeholder 
France 12.7 Stakeholder 
Britain 12.2 SH 
Denmark 12.0 Stakeholder 
Belgium 11.4 Stakeholder 
US 11.2 SH 
Germany 10.5 Stakeholder 
Switzerland 10.4 Stakeholder 
 




3.2.     Minority Shareholder 
 
There are differences in equating high stock returns in countries with less legal 
protection for minority shareholders to high returns in countries with greater minority 
shareholder’s protection.  There is big concern in countries with weak shareholders 
rights, where the controlling shareholders’ expropriate minority shareholders.  Thus, in 
these countries, the minority shareholders may not enjoy the high returns if their shares 
are heavily discounted in value due to the risk of appropriation, even if the stock market 
is making good profit.  The increase in stock prices only accrued to shares in the 
controlling Stakeholders.  Germany, Sweden, France, Netherlands provide minority 
shareholders right than the US and Britain (La Porta et al. (1998, 2000).  The argument 
is that those countries with greater minority shareholders right enjoy high returns during 
high stock market performance.  While, those with less minority shareholders right in 
the stakeholder economy may not actually enjoy high returns during rising stock market 
performance.  Hence, the comparison between minority shareholders right in different 
countries is misleading in ascertaining the true values of stock returns. To balance this 
argument, there must be provisions to show that the appropriation, which exists in both 
shareholder economy are comparable (Nenova, 2003). 
 
 
 3.2.1.     The Role of Institutional Investors  
 
Institutional investors have become important participants in the US equity markets, 
especially in the past two decades.  The number of institutional investors and the 
amount of funds they manage have grown dramatically.  Institutional ownership has 
grown from 35 per cent of the equity market in 1981 to 58 per cent by the end of 2002. 
This increase represents a substantial shift in the investment preferences of American 
households.  Only 19 per cent of the US households invested in equities in 1983, the 
percentage increased to 36.6 per cent by 1992 to 49.5 per cent by the end of 2002.  Most 
household investment is channelled into equity markets through institutional investors 
such as mutual funds and retirement accounts.  Institutional investors have proven to be 
successful in managing client’s money.  They have been able to deliver significantly 
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risk-adjusted excess returns.  Significant stock selection skills have helped institutional 
investors to enhance their overall portfolio performance (Binay, 2005) 
 
The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) is an organization of over 120 public and 
private pension funds with a total asset of its member funds exceeding £1 trillion.  The 
objective of the organization is to encourage member funds, as major shareholders, to 
take an active role in protecting plan assets.  They direct their activism towards the 
boards of directors and managers of listed firms for the purpose of inducing them to 
make changes necessary to improving firm performance.  The council releases it focus 
list of under performing firms yearly.  This marks the rise of the shareholder’s activism 
and explains corporate takeover due to the decline of the stock market.  The rise of the 
institutional investors provided effective bills for anti-takeover stratagems by firms and 
anti-takeover legislation passed by state governments.  It becomes imperative to ask a 
vital question that to what extent can shareholder activism substitute for an active 
market for corporate control, in disciplining firms that deviate from shareholders wealth 
maximization? (Song & Szewczyk, 2003). 
 
 
3.2.1.     Non-Executive Owners 
 
Non- executive owners can play a proactive role and still bring wider perspective 
through their actions that can significantly improve a company’s corporate governance 
arrangements.  They do this by expressing an independent viewpoint on conflicts of 
interest; protecting the rights of minority interest while ensuring that they act in the 
interests of the company.  Recently, non-executive directors face increasing pressure to 
demonstrate the above benefit especially at this time when corporate failure is marked 
with corruption.  Irish law makes no distinction between executive directors and non-
executive directors.  The reason is that they would be subjected to the same liability as 
any other director, when compensating their company for loss, as a result of the breach 
of contract by directors.  They are also subjected to the same rules in relation to 




3.3.     The Importance of Corporate Governance Ratings 
 
In recent times, markets are embracing the norm of corporate governance, which helps 
to checkmate the lag in investment risk while enhancing corporate reputation.  
Corporate governance becomes essential in the face of a prolonged bull market and 
overheated market phenomenon. 
 
Chief Executives and Chief Financial Officers of any corporation are invested with 
power and authority to carry out functions in the best interest of the organisation. 
However, with regards to finances belonging to the public, especially in Public Limited 
companies, laws are stipulated which act as checks and balances for the market.  These 
laws ensure that the share holders and public’s interest are protected.  And these checks 
and balances involve the following: the Board of Directors, Accountants, Lawyers, 
Securities Analysts, Proxy Advisors, Investment Bankers, Audit Committees, 
Regulators and even the Press.  Some of these professionals have carried out their jobs 
with great level of professionalism while others have failed.  There are still loopholes in 
this system.  It is impossible for the private sector to monitor corporate governance at 
publicly held companies on a regular basis.  Therefore, to help institutional investors to 
measure the rate of a company’s performance, and assess their governance practices to 
ascertain when there is a real investment risk, a numerical rating system was invented. 
(Sherman, 2004).  
 
Some companies involved with rating of firms offer cross-border or domestic rating 
services.  For example, the Deminor is a domestic rating service of an independent 
consulting which focuses on Western Europe. Its services include investment advice on 
corporate transactions, proxy voting recommendations, litigation support and 
shareholder activism.  The Deminor Rating Service is available to both corporations and 
investors.  They offer a soliciting corporate governance analysis, ratings and investor 
report to the company.   And the company decides whether the rating and investor 
report should be made public or not.  Deminor also sells subscriptions to investors for 
unsolicited ratings.  Their services currently cover the FTSE Eurotop 300 and they 
adopt a methodology based on approximately 300 corporate governance indicators. 
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Most of these rating firms whether solicited or unsolicited, have the same applications, 
but uses different methodology and corporate governance indicator to measure a 
company’s corporate governance system (Sherman, 2004). 
 
Sherman, (2004) recommended the efforts of the rating initiatives but still asserts that 
the real reform must take place inside the boardroom and the company itself.  
 
Koehn and Veng (2007) questioned whether corporate governance ratings have 
functioned as reliable indicators of a company’s shareholder’s returns.  This is so, 
because after the wave of accounting and corporate governance scandals of corporations 
like Enron, WorldCom, Hollinger, Nortel, Xerox, Cendant, Royal Ahold, to mention but 
a few, investors began to demand more information about how major companies are 
actually being managed.  For instance, Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s are rating 
agencies that have failed to give accurate report of the state of these companies even 
when dangers loomed.  It was only after the press licked out the problems of Parmalat 
did S & P downgraded the company’s debt of eight notches.  This matter was a huge 
failure at the credit ratings agencies and has raised several questions about the reliability 
of corporate governance ratings. 
 
3.4.     Reliability of Corporate Governance Ratings 
 
Koehn and Ueng (2007) argued that corporate government ratings agencies have not 
agreed in their assessment of particular companies.  For example, in November 2002 
before disclosures about the accounting problems of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
Governance Metrics International had assigned both companies a “well below average 
ratings.”  In the spring of 2004, S & P gave Fannie Mae, a top governance rating of 9.0. 
Moody’s, at the same time, granted both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac AAA ratings. 
Even the Corporate Library praised Fannie Mae, recommending the company’s rigorous 
approach to corporate governance.  But within a lag of two years, the performances of 
these agencies were puzzling, given that a lot changed at either company. Furthermore, 
while Corporate Library awarded Citigroup an “F”, GMI ranks the company’s 
governance “above average”.  Honeywell got an “F” from Corporate Library, but GMI 
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ranked it “above average”, (Duffy, 2003).  Thus a clear indication of very conflicting 
results.  It becomes pertinent to ask: Whose ranking is correct? 
 
The credibility of the evaluators was in doubt and the mode of evaluation needed to be 
reviewed.  However, Koehn and Ueng (2007) discovered that credit ratings agencies in 
America and Europe are powerful, but doubt whether the GRAs that focus exclusively 
on governance will be able to obtain the same degree of influence.  They stressed that 
those companies wishing to tap the equity markets suffer if they do not obtain a credit 
rating.  Some investment funds in America and Europe are prohibited from investing in 
a company’s debt, or equity, that does not bear a GRA rating of investment grade, 
regardless of how good that company’s governance rating is.  However that seems, at 
present, the market does not appear to impose any penalty on firms with low 
governance ratings.  They also maintain that although some mutual and pensions funds 
look at governance ratings, but have not made their investment decisions contingent 
upon such.  For instance, In Europe, stock appreciation of firms shows no significant 
positive correlation with CGQ ratings as well as has several reasons which doubt the 
value and viability of governance rating systems. 
 
3.5.     Business Ethics, Disclosures and Transparency 
 
The perception of the public on corporate business ethics changed dramatically after the 
discovery of the unethical acts by management of WorldCom and Enron.  The scandal 
reduced consumer confidence and portfolios investment.  The faith of the accounting 
profession was undermined.  Since then, corporate stakeholders have called for more 
transparent financial reporting and evidence of better ethical conduct.  Restoring the 
public confidence becomes vital and efforts to do this entail adopting best practices of 
ethical conduct.  One example of a good practice in transparency is for a corporation to 
make its code of ethics readily available for public scrutiny, on its website.   The close 
down of Andersen and the collapse of Enron was a total blow in the corporate world 
that shook corporate America.   As a result, stockholders adjusted their decision-making 
processes to reflect their concerns over unethical business practices.  For instance, in 
2003, PricewaterhouseCoopers white paper went beyond current requirements in order 
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to achieve a deeper level of transparency in corporate reporting.  In 1988, defense 
contractor, Sundstrand, was fined $227 million for ethical violation.  Sundstrand stocks 
fell by 25 per cent and its image was tarnished by the incident.  Sundstrand was 
successful in changing its ethical culture through internal initiatives and parallel to the 
ethical growth process or spectrum (Bernardi & LaCross, 2005). 
 
Ethical spectrum is a mode of managing morality (Rossouw & Van, 2003).  This 
spectrum includes immoral mode, reactive mode, compliance mode, integrity mode, and 
totally aligned organisation mode.  The immoral mode is concerned with the company’s 
bottom line, which overlooks and alienates the company’s stakeholders, hence 
stakeholders agitation over this trend.  In the reactive mode, the corporation tries to 
protect themselves against the dangers of unethical behaviour.   The compliance mode is 
the company’s desire to have a good ethical reputation that focuses on a rule based 
approached to ethics.  The integrity mode requires the firm to become more proactive in 
the promotion of ethical behaviour while engaging all of its stakeholders in walking the 
ethics talks. The integrity mode deals with a company’s environment and a 
responsibility that rest at the very heart of the company’s obligation to create a 





4.    STOCK RETURNS AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
 
Investors monitor, closely, how major markets react and they apply this knowledge as 
part of their investment strategies in their interested stock markets.  The US market is 
regarded as the most influential market, and predicts other national market returns - the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Canada.  Some economists found out that the US 
market react to some fundamental factors or news at a faster rate.  Shackman (2006) 
and, Nandha and Hammoudeh (2007) researched further on the economic variables or 
world news that might explain the movement in national stock markets.  They found out 
that observed economic variables, such as exchange rates, world market portfolios, 
dividend yields, interest rates, industrial production index and commodity prices, could 
explain only small parts of the movements in a national stock market returns.  Connolly 
and Wang (2003) also examined this theory and discovered that macroeconomic news 
announcements made in the US, the UK, and Japan accounted for a very small part in 
explaining the return co-movements within national markets. 
 
4.1.     Operation of the Stock Market 
 
Keane (1983) “defined the operation of the stock market as a system that involves some 
processes which are made up of three distinct markets”: The first is the Capital 
Allocation Market. This is a centre where funds from savers are distributed amongst 
productive users of capital.  The second system is the Financial Securities Markets and 
it involves securities owned by the suppliers of capital traded by them.  Lastly, there is 
the Financial Information Market. In this market, information is transmitted from the 
productive users of capital to the suppliers.  The relationship with the stock market 
operations are the suppliers of capital, the users of capital and the informative markets 
to which the operation revolves.  The stock market operations have changed drastically 
due to modern technologies while maintaining their basic function- which is to provide 
and allocate capital market primary roles.  The primary roles are to provide and allocate 
capital funds to firms with profitable investment opportunities; to offer an avenue of 
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liquidity for individuals to invest current income, or borrow against future income, 
which enables them to achieve their preferred pattern of investment. 
 
The investment in capital market involves a great deal of uncertainty and risk.  It has a 
way of transferring such risks among the parties involved in these transactions.  Today, 
credit crisis explains the transfer of risk amongst parties involved.  For instance, the 
credit crisis in the US spread to other financial institutions all over the globe, in such 
related financial transactions (Financial Times Online 2008, September 30).   The 
capital market has proven that stock prices are meaningful in the sense that it reflects 
real economic variables and not simply random numbers.  This also explains why the 
stock market makes headlines in the media and is closely monitored by investors all 
over the world (Lorie, Dodd & Kimpton, 1985). 
 
4.2.     Market Efficiency Theory 
 
The premise on Market efficiency has no validity assumption.  It cannot be based on a 
condition of a certain proportion, or that there are talented or skilled investors.  It cannot 
be ascertained that most or indeed any investor has access to all available information or 
can comprehend all information.  There is no consensus among scholars on the 
significance of such information (Keane, 1983).  Some economists describe efficient 
market with respect to a set of information, but assert that it is impossible to make 
profits by trading on the basis of such sets of information (Kaplan & Roll, 1973).  
 
Capital market efficiency relies on the ability of arbitrageurs to recognise the lapses in 
prices and, then, use this opening to make a profit. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005). 
Capital market is of the assumption that security prices fully reflect all the available 
information at all times.  The competition among investment analyst lead to a stock 




4.2.1.     Weak Form of Market Efficiency 
 
The weak form of market efficiency states that current securities prices fully reflect all 
the information implied by the historical sequence of price and returns, so that the 
knowledge of that sequence is of no value in forming expectations about future prices. 
The early investigations of weak market were in two major forms: test of serial 
independence in security returns and test of the performance of trading rules based only 
on prior performance.  Boldt and Arbit (1984), found out that the monthly price change, 
in the future markets, are very close to random and the distributions are very close to 
those expected that can signal profit opportunities on the assumption that each month’s 
changes independently from the previous months, with a 0.57 probability of a monthly 
rise and 0.43 of a decline.  But, Osborne (1959) documented that certain amount of 
irrationality exists in stock price movement in the structure of price behaviour.  For 
example, the tendency of closing prices concentrated at the highs or lows for a trading 
day, did not detect any inefficiencies that would open profit opportunities to anyone 
other than the exchange specialists (Boldt & Arbit, 1984). 
 
 
4.2.2.     Semi-Strong Form of Market Efficiency 
 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency emphasizes that securities prices fully reflect 
all generally available public information, so that investors cannot profit abnormally 
from acting on such information.  Lorie et al. (1985) agrees to this assertion and stated 
that the semi strong form of market is where the current prices fully reflect public 
knowledge, on the underlying companies.  And the efforts to acquire and analyse this 
knowledge, cannot be expected to produce superior investment results.  The analysis on 
semi-strong form of market focuses on the adjustment of securities prices to a particular 
kind of information.  For example, a stock split, dividend change or earnings report. 
Each of the tests contributed to the findings on the validity of the market, but they were 
not conclusive.  Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll’s (1969) test the semi-strong form of 
market.  Their investigation was on stock price performance on stock split 
announcement dates to detect any unusual return patterns.  Since the split changes the 
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denomination of ownership, announcement of a split does not necessarily provide the 
market with new information.  However, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) 
presumed that the splits may be associated with the appearance of more fundamental 
information involving dividend (Boldt & Arbit, 1984). 
 
 
4.2.3.     Strong Form of Market Efficiency 
 
Strong form of market efficiency shows that, not even those with privileged information 
can make use of it to secure superior investment results (Lorie et al. 1985).  The strong 
form of market securities is where the prices fully reflect all information, public 
proprietary and even, in extreme interpretation, monopolistic. It means that even 
investors with special information cannot profit from its use.  There is very little support 
for the existence of the strong form of market, Osborne (1959) findings contradicts a 
strict interpretation of the strong form efficiency with monopolistic information.  
Testing the strong form of market is to verify whether there is a group of professional 
managers who have consistently outperformed the market average.  Unfortunately, it is 
impossible to answer this question conclusively, given available data and statistical 
techniques.  Tests were conducted by various economists but none has strong evidence 
on the strong form of market (Boldt & Arbit, 1984). 
 
Another source of information that can be calculative is the inside information. This 
information strongly contradicts the strong form of market. Lorie et al. (1985) warns 
that insider trading is illegal. He further reveals that it exists as a result of the 
announcements by corporate officials who pass information to the stock market.  These 
insiders can make profit by trading before making the announcements.  Another 
example reveals that there is evidence that public earnings announcement forecasted by 
corporate managements are associated with positive stock price movements.  The 
corporations’ management could earn substantial positive returns by trading in their 




5.    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This work is theoretical and empirical as well as quantitative based.  Information and 
data for this research is source from several scholarly documentations.  University of 
Vaasa possess a financial market data bank as a source for the S&P 500 data.  The 
Yahoo finance possesses internet data web as a source for all vital accounting 
information on the S&P 500 firms.  The internet is the source for all market 
information.  The Gompers index is source directly from Gompers website.  Other 
information is source from the University of Vaasa library and data banks in which 
journal articles and text books are consulted.  
 
5.1.     Data Description 
  
This research utilizes the historical information index values of the S&P 500 and 
Gompers et al. (2003) corporate governance ratings.  The corporate governance index 
and the control variables will represent my explanatory variables while the dependent 
variable represents the future stock returns values.  The market returns and the stock 
returns are estimated using the expected return model.  The control variables are beta 
and are estimated from the excel slopes model (known_Y’s, known_X’s).  It is the 
returns slope of the linear regression line through the given data points (market returns, 
stock returns).  The Yahoo finance provided the information and the data for the 
market-value (size) from the daily market summary that represents the recapitalization 
values.  Also, the Yahoo finance provided the values for the book-to-market equity 
through the net tangible assets (book equity), and the ratio are estimated using the 
model mentioned below.  The stock price and common shares outstanding are also from 







5.1.1.     Standard and Poor 500 (S&P 500) 
 
The Standard and Poor 500 index represents the capitalization-weighted index of 500 
stocks.  It began in 1957 and represents the best single US equities market that includes 
500 leading companies from leading industries of the US economy.  The index is 
designed to measure performance of the broad domestic economy through changes in 
the aggregate market value of 500 stocks representing all major industries.  They are 
traded on either the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ.  They consist mainly with 
the large cap segment of the market.  This work makes use of the entire 500 firms that 
have up-to-date available data at the time of this research. 
 
Table 2     Sample of S&P 500 Stock Returns 
 
 
Name 2007 2008 
3M 0.082 (-0.304) 
Abbott 0.153 (-0.044) 
AK-Steel 1.736 (-0.791) 
Altria Group 0.173 (-0.348) 
American Express (-0.143) (-0.637) 
Avery Dennison (-0.218) (-0.376) 






5.1.2.     Gompers, Ishii & Metrick 2003 Corporate Governance Index 
 
This index is constructed using the 24 governance rules derive from the publications of 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC).  The IRRC is the main data source 
for Gompers index constructions. This is because they published detailed listings of 
corporate governance provisions for individual firms in Corporate Takeover Defenses. 
The governance index acts as a proxy for balance of power between shareholders and 
managers.  The 24 governance rules is a provision derived from variety of public 
sources such as the annual reports and the proxy statements from the Fortune 500 
companies, Forbes and Business week publications.  The 24 governance rules also 
consist of other sources that include corporate by laws and charters, by law provisions, 
firm-level rules, and state laws.  The 24 provision is further grouped into five major 
corporate governance categories.  A point is reduced from every firm that has provision 
to reduce shareholders right and a point is awarded to firms which increase 
shareholder’s right.  The firm with the strongest shareholder’s right is awarded G-score 
of 1 point and the firm with the weakest shareholder’s rights is awarded G-score of 19 
points.   
 
The firm with the strongest shareholder’s right or having lowest management power are 
grouped into well-governed portfolio and the firm with the weakest shareholder’s rights 
or highest management control are group into bad-governed portfolio.  The firm with 
the highest point are therefore the weak stocks, and the firm with the weakest points are 
thus, the good governed stocks.  The data is from 1990 to 2006 and consist of 14000 
firms’ observations and ratings.  This thesis will make use of the same 500 data 
representing the S&P 500, to form a portfolio between the better governed and the weak 
governed firms.  Firms from S&P 500 were matched with the same firms from the 
Gompers index from the lower score range to represent the portfolio of the strongest 
corporate governance.  The bottom firms with the higher score range will represent the 
portfolio of the weakest corporate governance.  This strategy separates the two 
portfolios under review.  The Gompers index only provided data up to 2006.  Therefore, 
the 2006 ratings were matched with the 2008 stock returns data of the S&P 500 firms.  
This way, the strength of the corporate governance in 2006 should be able to reflect in 
the future stock returns for 2008 year period.  This is because corporate governance 
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structures change slowly and the implications of the governance index can be seen with 
a significant lag. 
 
Table 3     Gompers Governance Provisions and Selections 
                                                    
Percentage of Firms with governance provision 
 
Provisions 1993 1995 1998 
Delay    
Classified board 80.0 85.7 87.9 
Blank check 60.4 61.7 59.4 
Protection    
Compensation plans 65.8 72.5 62.4 
Contracts 15.2 12.7 11.7 
Voting    
Bylaws 16.1 16.0 18.1 
Charter 3.4 3.1 3.0 
Cumulative voting 16.5 14.9 12.2 
Secret ballot 9.5 12.2 9.4 
Other    
Directors duties 7.4 7.2 6.7 
Fair price 35.2 33.6 27.8 
State    
Business combination 
law 
88.5 88.9 89.9 
Directors duties laws 5.0 5.0 4.4 
Number of firms 1343 1373 1708 
 
 
Sources: Sample table lifted from Gompers et al. (2003). It contains selected 
governance provision between 1993 and 1995.  The data are drawn from IRRC 




5.1.3.     Good Governance Portfolio 
 
 
The objective of this study is to empirically distinguish the good governance portfolio 
from the weak, with the help of the Gompers index, beta, market value and book-to-
market variables.  The governance portfolio was constructed after the Gompers 
governance ratings were matched with the S&P 500 firms. In this study, the Good 
Governance Portfolio consists of 250 firms.  The good governance portfolio of Gompers 
ratings are between 3 and 9 points.  The good governance sample size is represented as 
follows: 
 
Table 4     Good Governance Distribution Size 
 
Good governance index No. of Firm’s 
CG =3 3 
CG =4 4 
CG= 5 14 
CG =6 35 
CG =7 47 
CG =8 65 
CG =9 82 
Total No. of Firm’s 250 
 
 





Table 5     Sample of the Good Governance Portfolio 




Name of Firm Gompers et al. 2005 
CG-index 
Gompers et al. 2006 
CG-index 
Wal-mart 5 6 
Du Pont de Numours 5 6 
PepsiCo 4 4 
Amazon 3 4 
South Company 5 7 
 
 
5.1.4.     Weak Governance Portfolio 
 
The weak governance portfolio in this study consists of 216 of the S&P 500 firms.  
Incomplete data reduced the sample size. The Gompers ratings of between 10 and 16 
points were matched with the correspondence S&P 500 firms.  The sample size of the 





Table 6     Weak Governance Portfolio Distribution Size 
 
Poor governance ratings No. of Firm’s. 
CG =10 62 
CG =11 67 
CG =12 39 
CG =13 26 
CG =14 11 
CG =15 8 
CG=16 3 
Total No. of firm’s. 216 
 
 
In this study, the 216 firm’s represents the weak governance portfolio. 
 
Table 7     Sample of the Weak Governance Portfolio 
 





Gompers et al. 2005 
CG-index 
Gompers et al. 2006 
CG-index 
Ameren 10 10 
Amerisource  10 11 
Mylan Lab 14 14 
PPG Industries 14  15 




The above tables show the good and weak governed portfolios as posited by the 
Gompers et al. updated (2006) ratings.  The total number of the portfolios is 466.  They 
represent the total number of complete available data at the time of this research.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the lower the CG-index value the better the corporate governance 
ratings of the firm, while the higher the CG-index values the poorer the corporate 
governance ratings of the firm.  
 
5.2.     Methodology 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine stock returns relationship with corporate 
governance.  Cross-sectional analysis was employed to determine stock returns average 
and the significant level of the independent variables that explain stock returns.  The 
multivariate model through the cross-sectional analysis explains the relationship 
between stock returns, corporate governance and control variables.  The empirical test 
begins with simple mean test of each estimated sample.  The correlation test determines 
if stock returns are higher for firms’ with lower values of CG-index.  The cross-
sectional analysis is use to ascertain the difference in returns between the portfolios, and 
whether the level of the CG-index or the control variables would predict stock returns or 
not.  The control variables consist of the market value, book-to-market ratio and beta, 
which are used to measure the economic characteristic of the firm in relation to the risk 
of the stock, and they are real determinants of systematic risk.  They are widely 
discussed and used by past scholars: for example (Fama and French 1992; Datta and 
Dhillion 1993; Kallunki 1996; Kothari and Warner 1997).  Cross-sectional analysis 
shows the correlation between stock returns and corporate governance, it is a tool for 
estimating how the future stock returns performance are linked to corporate governance, 








5.3.    Market Beta 
 
The beta variable represents the systematic risk for the S&P 500 stock returns, and they 
are calculated from the Microsoft Excel application, with the help of the slope formula. 
The market beta was estimated from the Excel slopes model.  
 
Βi= (Market returns Rmt, Stock returns Rit)                               (1) 
 
 It is the returns slope of the linear regression line through the given data points (market 
returns, stock returns) 
 
This study used the beta coefficient to predict returns through the regression.  
According to capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the beta coefficient captures the 
systematic risk of a firm.  The empirical correspondence of the beta can be regarded as a 
measure of the systematic risk, and it can be used to make risk adjustment.  
 
5.4.     Expected Return 
 
This involves the estimation of the S&P 500 firm’s stock returns and the market returns. 
In this thesis, they are calculated as follows: 
 
Returns =E(r) =   P1 – P0                                          (2) 
                               P0 
Where; 
 
P1 = Price at the end of the year. 
P0 = Price at the beginning of the year. 
 
5.5.     Book-to-market-Ratio 
 
Book-To-Market-Equity Ratio is one of the control variables that determine whether a 
security is undervalued or overvalued.  It explains the relative distress nature of the firm 
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(Fama and French, 1993).  When the ratio is greater than 1, the company is considered 
undervalued because its assets are worth more than its value in the stock market.  When 
the ratio is less than 1, the company is said to be overvalued- the assets are worth less 
than its market value in the stock market.  It is calculated thus: 
 
Book-to-market ratio = Book Equity or Net Tangible Assets                     
                                            Market Value of the Equity                                   (3) 
 
5.6.     Market Value of the Firm (size)  
 
Market Value of the Firm is used to measure the size of the firm.  It is the market 
recapitalization that is calculated by the number of shares outstanding and the current 
stock price. 
 
Market Value = Current Stock Price x Total Common Shares Outstanding (Fama and 
French, 1992). 
 
5.7.     Multivariate Model 
 
The multivariate model is one of the most important models used in this study to carry 
out the empirical test through cross-sectional analysis. The corporate governance and 
the study control variables predict stock returns.  The control variables are beta, market 
value and book-to-market ratio.  The hypotheses are tested with the multivariate model 
to ascertain the significance of the level of corporate governance to explain stock 
returns with the measures of the t-statistics instrument.  See table 10 and 14. 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑔 + 𝐵2𝐵 + +𝐵3𝑚𝑣 + 𝐵4𝑏𝑚𝑟 + 𝑒𝑡               (4) 
 
Where; 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  = Stock returns 2008  
α = Constant (intercept) 
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Cg = Corporate governance index 
B = Beta  
Mv = Market value (size) 
Bmr = Book-to-Market Ratio 
Et = Error term 
 
The multivariate regression model determines whether the corporate governance index 
has any relationship with stock returns.  Also, it will identify which control variables 





6.    EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
The primary goal of this paper is to study the relationship between corporate 
governance and stock returns.  The other is to establish whether stock returns are higher 
for firms’ with better governance portfolio.  This is to ascertain that the level of 
corporate governance may predict stock returns.  This paper examines the 2008 S&P 
500 returns, and the updated Gompers 2006 past governance index. 
 
 
Table 8     Descriptive Statistics of the Corporate Governance Portfolio 
 
          Stock Returns CG-index Beta Market value BMR 
 Mean -0.36  9.4  0.5  21.8  2.9 
 Median -0.37  9.0  0.5  8.5  0.5 
 Maximum 0.39  16.0  1.1  904.8  97.1 
 Minimum -0.97  3.0  0.1  1.2 -69.9 
 Std. Dev. 0.2  2.4  0.2  53.6  12.0 
 Skewness 0.1 0.1 0.3 10.8 2.9 
Kurtosis 2.8 2.8 2.7 163.3 31.6 




Table 8 gives the overview of the samples average, skewness and the kurtosis.  The 
stock returns measure of skewness is positive.  This implies that stock returns 
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distributions is non-symmetric.  The kurtosis has low value less than 3, indicating high 
thinner tails distribution, high volatility, and larger degree of variance from the mean.  
The stock returns mean is negative while the median is greater than the mean.  It 
confirms that the data are skewed.  The table reveals that CG-index has a minimum 
value of 3, which represents the lowest level of CG-index and the maximum value of 
16, which reveals the highest level of the CG-index, the median is 9.  The standard 
deviation explains how the distributions are spread closer to the mean.  The control 
variables have positive mean with varying standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis.  
It confirms that the samples are non-symmetric.  The sample mean test is based on the 
cross-sectional average for each variable.  The sample data are not in logs. 
 
6.1.      Correlation of Stock Returns and the Independent Variables 
 
In order to investigate whether corporate governance has relationship with stock returns, 
I examined the pair-wise correlation relationship between stock returns and corporate 
governance and the control variables.  The correlation coefficient explains the linear 
relationship with the variables. 
 
Table 9     Pair Wise Correlation Matrix   
 
 
 RETURNS CG-INDEX BETA MARKETVALUE BMR 
RETURNS  1.       
CG-INDEX -0.03  1.    
BETA  0.55  0.004  1.    
MARKETVALUE  0.02 -0.12  0.09  1.  





Stock returns relationship with corporate governance is negative.  It reveals that stock 
returns are higher for firms with better governance.  Beta has positive relationship with 
stock returns and more significantly correlated than other variables. The BMR 
represents book-to-market equity. 
 
Table 10     Cross-Sectional Analysis of Governance Portfolio 
 
To ascertain the relationship between corporate governance and stock returns, a cross-
sectional analysis and the multivariate model was employed to test the significance of 
the governance index. 
 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
CG-Index -0.003876 -1.052276 
Beta 0.641469 14.08271** 
Market Value -0.000129 -0.773796 
Book-To-Market Equity 0.000256 0.343290 
 
  ** represent 1% statistical significant level 
 
 
Table 10 shows the results of the cross-sectional analysis between stock returns, 
corporate governance and the control variables.  Corporate governance coefficient is 
negative but statistically insignificant.  The analysis suggests that corporate governance 
do not have significant relationship with stock returns. Therefore the level of 2006 
Gompers index was not significant in predicting 2008 S&P 500 stock returns.  The beta 
variable has significant relationship with stock returns and can predict stock returns at 
1% statistical significant level.  The multivariate model describes how corporate 
governance and the control variables are connected to stock returns.  The dependent 
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variable is stock returns and the independent variables are corporate governance, beta; 
market-value and book-to-market ratio.  This regression employed the multivariate 
model in equation (4), described in chapter 5. 
 
Table 11     Test of Fitness of the Multivariate Model 
 





The adjusted R-square presents the strength of the relationship between stock returns 
and the control variables. The significant large value of the F-statistic suggests that the 
model is very fit.  The multivariate model in equation 4, described in chapter five was 
employed in this regression. 
 
6.2.     Comparison between Good and Weak Governance Portfolios 
 
This is to examine whether there is difference in stock returns between good governance 
portfolio and weak governance portfolio.  Cross-sectional average of all the samples 
was estimated and compared, and cross-sectional regression was carried out to ascertain 





Table 12     Descriptive Statistics of the Good Governance Portfolio 
 








      
Mean -0.36 7.5 0.52 25.25 3.28 
Median -0.35 8 0.52 9.3 1.05 
Minimum -0.97 3 0.08 1.21 -69.92 
Maximum 0.39 9 1.12 334.34 65.66 
Skewness 0.07 -0.9 1.4 3.60 0.3 
Kurtosis 2.7 3.3 2.8 18.55 20.44 
Standard Dev 0.2 1.3 0.2 43.48 11.94 
No. of firms 250 250 250 250 250 
 
 
Table 12 shows the cross-sectional average of stock returns and the independent 
variables of the good governance portfolio.  The table indicate that stock return is 
negative.  The average return of the good governance portfolio is -36%.  Stock returns 
distribution is non-symmetric and the kurtosis is thin tails distribution. The lower 
standard deviation indicates that the distributions are spread closer to the mean, which is 
very important for investors as it indicates that the stocks are low risk securities.  The 
table shows that the CG- index has minimum of 3 and maximum of 9, which represents 
the range of the good governance portfolio.  The market value and the book to market 
equity reported high standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness.  It indicates that the 
samples are non–symmetric. The model used in the analysis was equation 4, presented 
in chapter 5. 
48 
 





CG-index Beta Market 
Value 
BMR 
Mean -0.37 11.5 0.55 17.85 2.46 
Median -0.38 11 0.54 8.05 0.23 
Maximum 0.24 16 1.05 904.77 97.12 
Minimum -0.92 10 0.13 1.39 -30.94 
Standard Dev 0.2 1.4 0.2 63.2 12.2 
Skewness 0.2 1.0 0.2 12.9 5.9 
Kurtosis 2.7 3.5 2.4 181.2 44.7 
No. of Firms 216 216 216 216 216 
 
 
The weak governance portfolio is in the range between 10-16 as indicated by the 
minimum and the maximum CG-index statistics.  The stock returns average shows 
negative returns of -37% and the median is higher than the mean; this shows that the 
distribution is non-symmetric as indicated by the skewed value. The stock return 
kurtosis is thin tail distribution, but the standard deviation reveals that the values are 
closely distributed to the mean.  In furtherance to the above analysis, both the mean and 
the median stock returns are slightly more negative in table 13 than in table 12. This 
shows that the good governance portfolio slightly outperformed the weak governance 
portfolio in 2008.The beta control variable has lower mean and lower standard deviation 
than the market value and book-to-market equity.  However, the control samples are 
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non-symmetric distributed.  The results are cross-sectional average between weak 
governance portfolio, stock returns and the control variables. 
 
Table 14     Cross-Sectional Analysis of Good and Weak Governance Portfolio 
 
                               Good governance portfolio               Weak governance portfolio 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistics 
CG-Index 0.004953 0.529251 0.000380 0.045512 
Beta 0.667713 9.329704** 0.639236 10.48289** 
Market Value -0.000175 -0.555379 -0.000103 -0.0542722 
Book-To-Market  -0.000884 0.001120 -0.000366 -0.371180 
 
** represent 1% statistical significant level 
 
 
The regression reports the cross-sectional analysis between the good and the weak 
governance portfolio. Both the good and the weak corporate governance coefficients are 
positive, but statistically insignificant.  The analysis reveals that there is no significant 
difference in stock returns between the good and the weak governance portfolios.  The 
beta was confirmed again, a better predictor in this analysis.  The estimated model was 










Table 15     Test of the Empirical Model 
 
 
 Good governance portfolio Weak governance portfolio 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.267248 0.338178 
F-statistics 23.70369 28.46517 
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000000 0.000000 
 
 
Table 15 present the test of the goodness of fitness of the regression model.  Both 
portfolios reveal that the data fit the model in testing the study hypothesis. The 




7.     SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
On a general note, this paper analysed the level of relationship between future stock 
returns and past corporate governance.  It also examined whether there was difference in 
stock returns between good and weak governance portfolios.  In order to carry out the 
regression process to test the study hypotheses, this paper employed the cross-sectional 
analysis and multivariate model.  Cross-sectional analysis ascertained the sample 
averages.  The multivariate model explained the relationship between stock returns, 
corporate governance, and the control variables.  
 
There was sufficient evidence to ascertain that the level of corporate governance was 
insignificant in predicting 2008 stock returns in this study, and that there was no 
significant difference in returns between the good governance and the weak governance 
portfolios.  The cross-sectional regression analysis did not provide meaningful evidence 
to support the hypotheses in this study.   However, there is need for more research on 
many aspect of corporate governance especially between the firms’ and market 
variables.  The reason is that the debate on corporate governance is an on-going process 
and more rigorous research is needed to establish understanding in the changes of 
corporate governance, as it affects the dynamic firm-level environment. 
 
The major finding in this study was established with regards to the study hypothesis. 
 
H1 null: The level of corporate governance cannot predict stock returns. 
 
In this study, the null hypothesis was accepted.  There was no sufficient evidence that 
the level of corporate governance could predict stock returns.  This report was 
confirmed in table 10. Although the governance index coefficient was negative, the 
cross-sectional analysis indicated that the CG-index was also insignificant; which 
means that there was no relationship between the two variables. The finding revealed 
that the CG-index cannot predict stock returns.  The beta variable had positive 
relationship with stock returns and significant at 1% statistical level. The beta variable 
was confirmed a better predictor than other control variables.  However, in table 9, 
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stock returns relationship with corporate governance was negative and it revealed that 
returns were higher for firms with better governance. 
 
The second part of the regression provided conclusive evidence that was against this 
study hypothesis.  
 
H2 null: There is no difference in stock returns between good governance portfolio and 
weak governance portfolio. 
 
The null hypothesis was again accepted.  This analysis was confirmed in table 14. The 
analysis reports that both the good and the weak corporate governance has positive 
coefficients, but statistically insignificant. This result reveals that there was no 
significant difference in stock returns between the good and weak governance 
portfolios. But, the mean and the median analysis in table 12 and table 13 indicated that 
the stock returns of the good governance portfolio slightly outperformed the weak 
governance portfolio in 2008. 
 
Finally, the analyses in this study were based on one year S&P 500 data.  Therefore, 
future researchers should extend the scope of data to several years especially for the 
S&P 500 firms with Gompers index.  Another way to strengthen the argument that the 
good governance portfolio outperforms the weak is when future researchers compare 
the firm performance between the good and the weak governance portfolio of the S&P 
500.  On the other hand, future researchers can extend the scope of research by 
comparing the corporate governance correlations and volatility from data that includes 
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